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Sick and (Still) Broke: Why the Affordable Care Act 
Won‘t End Medical Bankruptcy 
 
Ryan Sugden  
In the time it takes to read this page, another person has declared 
bankruptcy because of medical debt.
1
 She
2
 was likely in her mid-
forties, with children, and owned a home.
3
 Perhaps illogically, she 
almost certainly had health insurance when she fell ill.
4
 She or her 
spouse had a job and, while not rich, she was likely in the working or 
middle-class.
5
 Yet, when she filed for bankruptcy her net worth was 
more than $44,000 in the red.
6
  
That is the face of the 2.8 to 3.3 million individuals affected by 
medical-expense-caused bankruptcy each year.
7
 While researchers 
can paint a profile of those who suffer from medical bankruptcy, its 
causes are as numerous as they are elusive. A constellation of factors 
is frequently cited: out-of-pocket medical expenses, lost income 
during illness, loss of medical coverage, underinsurance or no 
 
 
 
J.D. (2012), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2006), University of 
Wisconsin. I would like to thank my family, whose continued support and frequent dinner table 
debates have guided me through the years. 
 1. In 2007, an American family filed for an illness-related bankruptcy every 90 seconds. 
See David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a 
National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 744 (2009) [hereinafter Himmelstein, 2009]. 
 2. The majority of medical-expense-caused bankruptcies are filed by women. Id. at 743. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Of bankruptcy filers whose illness contributed to bankruptcy, 77.9% were insured at 
the onset of the illness. Id. at 744. 
 5. Id. at 743. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Himmelstein estimated that by 2007 medical bankruptcies had increased 50% from an 
earlier study of bankruptcies in which he reported that 1.9 to 2.2 million filers and dependents 
were affected by a medical bankruptcy in 2001. See David U. Himmelstein et al., MarketWatch: 
Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, 2 HEALTH AFFAIRS. W5-63, W5-67 (2005) 
[hereinafter Himmelstein, 2005]; Himmelstein, 2009, supra note 1, at 744.  
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insurance, and the pile-up of bills from using credit cards to pay for 
medical expenses.
8
 
In part to protect citizens from being saddled with medical debt, 
President Barack Obama championed comprehensive health care 
reform, culminating in the passage of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (―Affordable Care Act‖).9 The Act‘s main tenet 
is to expand access to health care by providing citizens with subsidies 
to pay premiums and out-of-pocket expenses.
10
 Under the reform 
measure, individuals are required to obtain health insurance, which 
continues to be sold by private insurers, but all new plans will be 
required to provide minimum benefit packages and cap out-of-pocket 
expenses.
11
 Yet, little is known about what effect, if any, the 
Affordable Care Act will have on medical bankruptcy. President 
Obama insisted that the proposed reforms were necessary, in part, to 
protect citizens from the spiraling costs of medical care which would, 
arguably, reduce the number of bankruptcies. But will they? 
The answer lies with the nation‘s private health insurance 
industry. Today, insurers are increasingly looking to consumer-
choice health plans, rather than the tight administrative controls of 
managed care, to deal with the rising costs of medical care.
12
 In a 
consumer-choice plan, patients are given greater control over their 
care but are responsible for higher deductibles and other onerous out-
of-pocket expenses.
13
 Advocates of consumer-choice plans believe 
that the infusion of individual choice will be more effective at 
stemming rising health care costs than the prevailing administrative 
controls of managed care.
14
 Even if true, such a move leaves families 
stricken by illness or injury on the hook for thousands of dollars in 
out-of-pocket expenses.
15
  
The Affordable Care Act caps some of these expenses and 
subsidizes the cost of acquiring insurance, but it will not provide 
 
 8. See Himmelstein, 2005, supra note 7. 
 9. See infra notes 106, 108 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 114–20 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 112–13, 123–26. 
 12. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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complete shelter from the financial liability of a privatized consumer-
driven health care system.
16
 Indeed, the Affordable Care Act, by 
moving 32 million previously uninsured and potentially lower-
income individuals into the marketplace, may actually accelerate the 
industry‘s move toward consumer-choice health plans.17 In effect, by 
eschewing comprehensive, single-payer universal health insurance 
and leaving virtually untouched the fundamental structure of our 
country‘s private health insurance industry,18 the Affordable Care Act 
has guaranteed that even medically insured individuals will continue 
to be on the hook for thousands of dollars of medical expenses.
19
 
In light of this, the question that ought to demand our attention, 
and the question that this Note attempts to answer, is not whether the 
Act will eliminate medical bankruptcy but rather, should it? Stated 
differently, because the Affordable Care Act maintained the market-
based approach that is the hallmark of our current health finance 
industry, are we better off with some medical bankruptcies than none 
at all? I argue that bankruptcy is a fundamental, if unsatisfying, 
component of a medical finance system that relies on market-based 
principles to reduce costs. While the Affordable Care Act will reduce 
the overall number of bankruptcies, and arguably eliminate the most 
morally objectionable causes of medical bankruptcy, in a system 
based on market principles there will—and must—be consumers 
whose own bad choices spell financial trouble. For society to ―win‖ 
and receive the benefits of a consumer-driven system, there must be 
some who ―lose.‖ 
In Part I of this Note, I begin with an examination of medical 
bankruptcy in America and analyze the factors and variety of medical 
expenses that cause an individual or family to file for bankruptcy. 
Part II briefly outlines the country‘s private health insurance industry 
and how variations in health coverage schemes affect a consumer‘s 
financial liability. I note that in the years leading up to the Affordable 
 
 16. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 171–72. I take no position on the wisdom of the Affordable Care Act 
or the variety of alternative health care reform proposals considered by Congress. Rather, this 
Note focuses on the effect that the Affordable Care Act, as enacted, will have on medical 
bankruptcy and the health insurance industry. 
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Care Act, insurers have increasingly injected market-based principles 
into health coverage thereby shifting greater financial liability onto 
consumers. In Part III, I turn to the recently enacted Affordable Care 
Act, focusing on the two primary ways that it seeks to improve the 
affordability of health insurance for consumers: (1) subsidies that 
reduce premium payments and out-of-pocket expenses and (2) strong 
regulations of all new health insurance plans.  
In Part IV, I analyze whether and to what extent the Affordable 
Care Act will affect medical bankruptcy, arguing that while the Act 
shelters citizens from catastrophic medical expenses—protection that 
will reduce the overall number of debtors—it will not completely 
eliminate medical bankruptcy. Instead, I suggest that the Affordable 
Care Act will accelerate the use of deductibles and out-of-pocket 
expenses to reduce rising medical costs. Because these market-based 
tools require that consumers be penalized for their poor financial and 
health decisions, a limited number of bankruptcies should be 
expected. The measure of the Affordable Care Act‘s success, 
therefore, should be measured by its ability to improve the 
affordability of care and not whether it completely eliminates medical 
bankruptcy. 
I. MEDICAL BANKRUPTCY IN AMERICA 
The costs of medical care and the number of bankruptcies 
attributable to illness are on the rise, with bankruptcies increasing 
50% from 2001 to 2007.
20
 In fact, over 62% of all individual 
bankruptcy filings in 2007 were traceable to a medical event,
21
 either 
directly through reported medical expenditures or indirectly by 
financial circumstances created by a medical condition.
22
 The poor 
 
 20. See Himmelstein, 2009, supra note 1, at 744. The authors compared results of their 
2007 study to a similar examination of medical bankruptcy in 2001. See Himmelstein, 2005, 
supra note 7. In the 2007 study, the number of debtors who met the 2001 definition for medical 
bankruptcy—defined as a debtor with over $1,000 in medical debt at the time of filing—
increased from 46.2% to 69.1%. Himmelstein, 2009, supra note 1, at 744. 
 21. Himmelstein, 2009, supra note 1, at 742. 
 22. Himmelstein collected data on bankruptcy filings by reviewing all of the 118,308 
bankruptcy petitions filed in the United States between January 25 and April 11, 2007 as well 
as conducting follow-up surveys and interviews with bankruptcy filers. See id. at 741–42. The 
authors defined ―medical bankruptcy‖ debtors as those who listed medical reasons as a specific 
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are not the only victims of this trend. Rather, medical bankruptcy is 
becoming an increasingly ―middle-class phenomenon.‖23 The average 
age of bankruptcy petitioners has increased to just over forty-four 
years old.
24
 Over 60% of medical debtors attended college
25
 and, on 
average, earned $2,586 in monthly household income.
26
 Over half of 
medical debtors were homeowners and three-quarters of bankruptcy 
petitioners or their spouses were currently employed.
27
  
The financial risk associated with medical care arises regardless of 
whether one has medical insurance at the onset of an illness.
28
 Four of 
every five medical debtors had insurance coverage at the onset of an 
illness.
29
 Certainly, going without health insurance leaves debtors 
responsible for significant medical expenses.
30
 However, many 
 
reason for their bankruptcy, who reported at least $1000 in uncovered medical bills in the past 
two years, who lost at least two weeks of work-related income because of an illness or injury, or 
who mortgaged their home to pay for medical bills. Id. at 742. This broad definition is not 
without its critics. See, e.g., infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 23. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE 
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 27 (2000) (―The people who file for bankruptcy are a cross-section of 
society, and bankruptcy is a middle-class phenomenon.‖). Nearly one in ten debtors who filed 
for bankruptcy in 1997 were fifty-five or older. Id. at 38. 
 24. Himmelstein, 2009, supra note 1, at 743. The mean age of the 2,314 bankruptcy 
petitioners studied by Himmelstein was 44.4, a six-year average age increase in just ten years. 
See SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 38 (noting that in 1997 the mean and median age of debtors 
was 38).  
 25. Himmelstein, 2009, supra note 1, at 743. Nonmedical bankruptcy petitioners attended 
college only slightly more frequently, at 65.8%, than did medical bankruptcy petitioners. Id. 
 26. The median monthly income of bankruptcy petitioners was $2,225, compared to 
$2,478 median income of nonmedical bankruptcy petitioners. Id. 
 27. The data reveal a 10% employment gap between medical (75.5%) and nonmedical 
(85%) bankruptcy petitioners. Id.  
 28. Id. at 744. ―At illness onset, 77.9% were insured: 60.3% had private insurance as their 
primary coverage; 10.2% had Medicare; 5.4% had Medicaid; and 2% had Veterans 
Affairs/military coverage.‖ Id. Data from a separate analysis of the bankruptcy filings found 
that ―having a basic health insurance policy does not necessarily protect these families from 
being crushed by the financial consequences of an illness or accident‖ and that ―there is no clear 
association between identifying a medical problem [on bankruptcy petitions] and being 
uninsured.‖ Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates 
Over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 
399–400 (2001). 
 29. Himmelstein, 2009, supra note 1, at 744. 
 30. Medically bankrupt families lacking health insurance at illness onset averaged 
$26,971 in out-of-pocket medical expenses, compared to $17,749 for families with coverage at 
the outset. Id. Those who lacked insurance almost universally cited its expense, and not denial 
of coverage because of a pre-existing condition, as the reason that they did not have insurance. 
Only 2.8% of those who lacked coverage reported that they were denied coverage because of a 
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debtors either have ―skimpy‖ health insurance or lose coverage after 
getting sick, leaving them responsible for significant medical 
expenses.
31
 In 2007, medical debtors insured at the onset of an illness 
were saddled with an average of $17,749 in out-of-pocket expenses,
32
 
with hospital bills, prescription drugs, doctors‘ bills, and premiums 
constituting the largest direct expenses.
33
 Over 90% of medical 
debtors had at least $5,000 in medical debt or had debt that was equal 
to 10% of their pretax income.
34
 The indirect expenses of medical 
care, such as transportation, lodging for family, and childcare also 
contribute to the cost.
35
 One study of breast cancer patients found that 
patients with comprehensive health insurance shouldered $1,455 in 
monthly out-of-pocket medical expenses, with indirect costs 
accounting for more than half of these expenses.
36
 
Job or income loss as a result of illness compounds the costs of 
medical care.
37
 Individuals may be stripped of health insurance as a 
result of job loss.
38
 Out-of-pocket expenses increased, on average, by 
 
preexisting condition, and 0.3% indicated that they thought, prior to illness, that medical 
coverage was unnecessary. Id. 
 31. Himmelstein, 2005, supra note 7, at W5-72; see also LESLIE J. CONWELL & JOEL W. 
COHEN, MEDICAL EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY, STATISTICAL BRIEF #73: CHARACTERISTICS 
OF PERSONS WITH HIGH MEDICAL EXPENDITURES IN THE U.S. CIVILIAN 
NONINSTITUTIONALIZED POPULATION, 2002 (2005). Among patients in the top 5% of medical 
expenses, more than one-third had out-of-pocket expenses that exceeded 10% of family income, 
and nearly one-fifth had expenses that exceeded 20% of family income. Id. 
 32. Himmelstein, 2009, supra note 1, at 744. 
 33. Id. Hospital bills were the single largest out-of-pocket expenses for nearly half of 
patients. The largest hospital bill expenses were for prescription drugs (18.6%) and doctors‘ 
bills (15.1%). Premiums represented the largest out-of-pocket expense for only 4.1% of 
patients. Id.  
 34. Id. at 741. 
 35. See Ahsan M. Arozullah et al., The Financial Burden of Cancer: Estimates From a 
Study of Insured Women with Breast Cancer, 2 J. SUPPORTIVE ONCOLOGY 271, 274 (2004). 
 36. Id. Direct medical expenses contributed to 41% of out-of-pocket expenses, while 
indirect expenses, such as transportation, childcare and restaurant meals, accounted for half of 
these expenses. Id. at 274–75.  
 37. See Himmelstein, 2009, supra note 1, at 744. Over one-third of debtors reported that 
someone in the patient‘s family had lost or quit a job on account of a medical event. ―In 19.9% 
of families suffering a job loss, the job loser was a caregiver.‖ Id. 
 38. Id. Between the onset of illness and bankruptcy, private coverage fell 6.2% (60.3% to 
54.1%), with a 6.6% drop in the number of employers contributing to coverage (43.2% to 
36.6%). Id. In a study of long-term disability benefits, 27% of companies surveyed dismissed 
employees, stripping them of health and life insurance benefits, once they filed for long-term 
disability; 24% more dismissed employees at a set interval after filing, typically six to twelve 
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more than $4,600 for those who lost coverage as their illness wore on 
as compared to those who kept insurance coverage throughout an 
illness.
39
 Safety net programs for long-term illnesses may not be 
enough; government disability benefits are intentionally pegged 
low,
40
 and private employers may not offer disability insurance at 
all.
41
 As a result, debts—medical or otherwise—that were 
manageable on a full salary can quickly become overwhelming when 
income drops as a result of an illness or injury.
42
 
Incurring debt is only part of the story; the cost of financing 
medical bills adds additional expense. Between the ubiquity of 
standard credit cards, patients‘ growing financial responsibility at the 
time of treatment,
43
 and medical providers‘ assertiveness in 
 
months. Joseph Pereira, To Save on Health-Care Costs, Firms Fire Disabled Workers, WALL 
ST. J., July 14, 2003, at A1. 
 39. Patients who had private insurance but lost it once they fell ill averaged $22,568 in 
out-of-pocket expenses, compared to $17,749 in out-of-pocket liability of those who kept 
insurance. See Himmelstein, 2009, supra note 1, at 744. In Himmelstein‘s earlier 2005 study, 
patients who initially had but lost coverage actually averaged higher out-of-pocket expenses 
than those who never had insurance at all. See Himmelstein, 2005, supra note 7, at W5-69. This 
phenomenon disappeared in his 2009 study. Himmelstein, 2009, supra note 1, at 744. 
 40. U.S. disability and rehabilitation programs are ―designed to avoid supporting people at 
their prior levels of income.‖ See SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 159. The average monthly social 
security benefit for a disabled worker was just $1,067 in 2010. See Annual Statistical Report on 
the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 2010, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 18 (Aug. 2011), 
available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2010/sect04.pdf. And fewer than 
half of workers who applied for disability benefits received any assistance at all; in 2009, the 
award rate of social security benefits to disabled workers was just 34.5%. Id. at 142. 
 41. See Cathryn Miller-Wilson, Becoming Poor: Stories of the Real “Safety Net” and the 
Consequences for Middle America, 13 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1, 12 (2009). ―[F]ewer than 
half of all employers with fewer than one hundred employees offer disability insurance.‖ Id. 
What‘s more, 63% of all disabling injuries or illnesses occur outside the workplace, which 
disqualifies employees from receiving workers compensation and increases the need for private 
disability insurance. See An Employer’s Guide to Disability Income Insurance, AM.‘S HEALTH 
INSURANCE PLANS 4 (2007), available at http://www.assurantemployeebenefits.com/816/ 
aebcom/xhtml_clip/disabilityedu/employersguide.pdf. 
 42. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 159. Families are hit with a ―double whammy‖ of 
financial pressure; debts that were manageable on a full salary fall into arrears while on 
disability. Id. Penalties and credit expenses, if used to pay for expenses while on disability, 
plunge households further into debt. Id. at 160. ―Whether fired for absenteeism or resigning due 
to illness, every day thousands of Americans find themselves without a job or unable to 
maintain a job, due to illness.‖ Miller-Wilson, supra note 41, at 8.  
 43. ―Nearly 80% of bankruptcy filers had received medical services or goods resulting in 
some self-pay obligation within two years before they filed for bankruptcy.‖ Melissa B. Jacoby 
& Mirya Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEATH 
POL‘Y, L. & ETHICS 239, 287 (2010). 
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collections,
44
 credit devices are commonly used to finance medical 
debt—a trend that is expected to grow.45 In 2001, patients charged 
$19.5 billion in medical expenses to Visa cards alone,
46
 and current 
estimates place the total volume of credit card expenditures for 
medical expenses in the tens of billions.
47
 Some debtors have even 
taken out second mortgages to pay for medical expenses.
48
 
For many, medical bills consume a large percentage of their 
household income.
49
 Yet, despite the high cost of medical care, it is 
unclear whether medical expenses can be cited as the direct cause of 
many bankruptcies.
50
 Individual and family budgeting is variable, 
 
 44. See COKER GROUP, MAXIMIZING BILLING AND COLLECTIONS IN THE MEDICAL 
PRACTICE 42–43 (2007). The report advises medical providers to adopt a policy instructing staff 
members to call for a billing manager when a patient states that they cannot make payment at 
the time of treatment. ―The manager should take the patient to a private room to discuss 
payment. The element of authority imposed by the billing or practice manager indicates that 
nonpayment is unacceptable.‖ Above all, the report admonishes, ―It‘s your money—ask for it!‖ 
Id.; see also Anna Wilde Mathews, Healthy Consumer: Beyond Co-Pay: Surprise Bills at the 
Doctor’s: To Ensure They Get Paid, Doctors Seek Entire Bill For Patient Upfront, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 5, 2009, at D1. A survey reported that more than half of medical providers collected more 
than merely co-pays from patients at the time of visit. Id. 
 45. See Jacoby & Holman, supra note 43, at 245, 253. 
 46. Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An Alternative 
Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 559 (2006). 
 47. See Jacoby & Holman, supra note 43, at 253. Twenty-nine percent of low and middle-
income households cited medical expenses as contributing to current levels of credit card debt. 
CINDY ZELDIN & MARK RUKAVINA, THE ACCESS PROJECT, BORROWING TO STAY HEALTHY: 
HOW CREDIT CARD DEBIT IS RELATED TO MEDICAL EXPENSES 1 (2007), available at http:// 
www.accessproject.org/adobe/borrowing_to_stay_healthy.pdf.  
 48. See Himmelstein, 2009, supra note 1, at 743, 745. Of debtors surveyed, 5.7% had 
mortgaged their home to pay for medical bills and a total of 6.8% of debtors had recently 
borrowed money to pay medical bills. Id. In a 2001 study, researchers found that 15% of all 
homeowners who had taken out a second or third mortgage did so to pay medical bills. 
Himmelstein, 2005, supra note 7, at W5-68. 
 49. Among citizens with medical expenditures in the top 5% of the nation, one-third had 
out-of-pocket expenses that consumed at least 20% of family income. See CONWELL & COHEN, 
supra note 31. 
 50. See David Dranove & Michael L. Millenson, Medical Bankruptcy: Myth Versus Fact, 
25 HEALTH AFF. w74 (2006). Dranove and Millenson have strongly rebuked Himmelstein‘s 
studies for his failure to provide a causal link between nonmedical conditions and bankruptcy. 
Id. at w75. Pointedly, Ranove and Millenson argue that Himmelstein‘s definition of medical 
bankruptcy employs circular logic. By contending that a medical debt that has already been paid 
off by the debtor contributes to bankruptcy by taking away savings or income that could have 
been used for other non-medical household expenses—expenses which ultimately lead to 
bankruptcy—Himmelstein and his partners, Ranove and Mellenson argue, have reached the 
―meaningless conclusion that all expenditures are responsible for all bankruptcies.‖ Id. at w77. 
The critique concludes by noting that because ―all debts are fungible, it is inappropriate to 
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debt is fungible, and the bankruptcy filings from which many 
researchers‘ conclusions are drawn are often ambiguous in terms of 
which event—if any—caused the bankruptcy-inducing debt.51 Yet, 
the fact remains that insurance premiums continue a relentless march 
upward,
52
 and the costs of health care continue to tug at the 
pocketbooks of insured middle-class consumers.
53
 
II. RISING COST OF MEDICAL CARE INCREASES CONSUMER BURDEN  
Consumers have shared responsibility for the cost of their medical 
care since the rise of the modern health insurance industry.
54
 Early 
employer-based health plans offered ―hospital insurance,‖ which 
covered surgical and in-hospital treatment, while consumers paid 
doctors and physicians directly for routine care.
55
 In 1929, consumers 
forked over 79% of all health care spending.
56
 However, expansion of 
 
single out any one form of debt as the proximate cause of bankruptcy,‖ and that medical debt is 
a much smaller part of the burden on debtors than the Himmelstein study contends. Id. at w77–
w78. One co-author of the Himmelstein study, Melissa Jacoby, defended the study‘s 
methodology, arguing that the use of credit cards to pay for medical services creates ―invisible 
medical debt‖ on bankruptcy court records, as the debt appears as mere credit debt and not a 
medical expense. See Jacoby & Holman, supra note 43, at 275. Medical debt stands apart from 
other financial obligations, Jacoby argued, because of the diligence patients showed in paying it 
off. Id. at 287. Some filers with the largest out-of-pocket expenses within two years of 
bankruptcy included no medical providers as creditors, indicating that paying for medical 
expenses was a priority for debtors and therefore, medical debt can be singled out among other 
expenses as a cause of subsequent bankruptcy. Id. at 287–88. 
 51. See Dranove & Millenson, supra note 50. 
 52. Family premiums for employer-sponsored health plans doubled between 2003 and 
2009, far outpacing the 13% growth of median family income over the same period. See CATHY 
SHOEN ET AL., State Trends in Premiums and Deductibles, 2003–2009: How Building on the 
Affordable Care Act Will Help Stem the Tide of Rising Costs and Eroding Benefits, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND 4 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.commonwealth fund.org/~/ 
media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2010/Dec/1456_Schoen_state_trends_premiums_dedu
ctibles_20032009_ib_v2.pdf.  
 53. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 23. In twenty-eight states in 2009, the average annual 
premium for family coverage consumed at least 18% of median family income. See SHOEN ET 
AL., supra note 52, at 5. Also in 2009, the average deductible for family plans was $1,610 for 
coverage obtained through an employer with more than 50 employees and $2,662 for coverage 
obtained through a smaller employer. Both were increases of at least 66% since 2003. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., HARRY A. SULTZ & KRISTINA M. YOUNG, HEALTH CARE USA 35 (7th ed. 
2011); Nancy S. Jecker, Can an Employer-Based Health Insurance System Be Just?, 18 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL‘Y & L. 657, 659–60 (1993). 
 55. See SUTLZ & YOUNG, supra note 54, at 68–69. 
 56. William D. White, Market Forces, Competitive Strategies, and Health Care 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
450 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 38:441 
 
 
private insurance and the growing costs of care made an out-of-
pocket finance system ―untenable.‖57 In 1960, out-of-pocket 
payments accounted for 56% of health care spending; fifteen years 
later it was just 33%.
58
 Meanwhile, health care spending 
skyrocketed.
59
 In less than twenty-five years, the percent of national 
income spent on health care nearly doubled, from 7% in 1970 to 
13.4% in 1993.
60
 
A. The Rise and Fall of Managed Care 
In the 1980s and 1990s, insurers and employers turned to 
managed care plans to reduce escalating health care spending.
61
 The 
rise of managed care, most typically offered to consumers as a Health 
Maintenance Organization (―HMO‖), is well documented.62 In an 
HMO, an insurer amasses consumers, tightly controls utilization of 
medical services, and extracts concessions from physicians and 
hospitals seeking to serve the HMO‘s hordes of patients.63 
Consumers‘ share of out-of-pocket health care costs in a managed 
care plan is greatly reduced, typically amounting to insignificant co-
pays.
64
 Yet, consumers may only visit in-network providers and are at 
the mercy of plan administrators who must approve certain 
procedures.
65
 For a brief period, managed care appeared to stunt the 
 
Regulation, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 137, 141.  
 57. Id. at 144. 
 58. Id. at 143–44. 
 59. Total health care spending as a percent of gross domestic product increased from 5.2% 
in 1960 to 17.6% in 2009. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICARD SERVICES, NATIONAL 
HEALTH EXPENDITURES AGGREGATE, PER CAPITA AMOUNTS, PERCENT DISTRIBUTION, AND 
AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENT GROWTH, BY SOURCE OF FUND (2010), available at 
https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf. In per capita terms, 
health spending increased 5,500%, from $147 per person in 1960 to $8,086 in 2009. Id. 
 60. See White, supra note 56, at 146. 
 61. See id. at 150–52. The number of HMOs peaked in 1987 at 651, while enrollment 
continued to increase throughout the 1990s, nearly tripling between 1985 and 1996. See Steven 
J. Balla, Markets, Governments, and HMO Development in the 1990s, 24 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL‘Y & L. 215, 217 (1999). 
 62. See, e.g., Debra A. Draper et al., The Changing Face of Managed Care, 21 HEALTH 
AFF. 11, 13 (2002).  
 63. Id. 
 64. See James C. Robinson, Reinvention of Health Insurance in the Consumer Era, 291 
JAMA 1880, 1881 (2004). 
 65. The focus of managed care plans was the influence of physicians, who were seen as 
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explosive growth of health care costs.
66
 By 1995, direct consumer 
spending for physician services had dropped to just 12%,
67
 and health 
care spending as a share of national income had leveled off, dropping 
from 13.4% in 1993 to 13.1% in 1997.
68
 Managed care plans 
proliferated; in 1999, an estimated 186.8 million people were 
enrolled in some type of managed care plan.
69
 
But objections to managed care came from many circles.
70
 
Consumers (and comedians alike) scorned the maze of referrals 
needed to receive care.
71
 Physicians were similarly chafed by the 
interference and second-guessing of HMO administrators.
72
 
Employers, too, were not seeing the promised reduction in the cost of 
 
experts that had primary influence over health utilization decisions and with whom insurers 
could more easily negotiate and bargain for concessions on prices charged for medical services. 
Id.  
 66. Of course, managed care was not the only reason that health care spending slowed 
and, in some measures, decreased in the mid-1990s—if it was a cause at all. See White, supra 
note 56, at 153. Rather, the important factor is that managed care grew in popularity, in part, as 
a result of its perceived success in depressing health care costs. Id.  
 67. Consumer spending on physician services stood at 35% in 1975. Id. From 1990 to 
1995 total out-of-pocket expenditures fell from 23% to 17.2%. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. The growth of managed care was truly spectacular. HMO enrollment was limited 
to just nine million Americans in 1980—4% of the population. See Balla, supra note 61. By 
1996, enrollment had ballooned to 63 million Americans, a six-fold increase. Id. 
 70. See James C. Robinson & Paul B. Ginsburg, Consumer-Driven Health Care Promise 
and Performance, 28 HEALTH AFF. w272, w273 (2009). Resentment for managed care was a 
―strange phenomenon‖ that came from numerous sources. Patients believed that the referral 
requirements and utilization reviews were an HMO‘s attempts to limit access to care, 
physicians resented second-guessing of medical decisions by insurer bureaucrats, liberals saw 
managed care as a roadblock to single-payer health insurance, and conservatives ―favored 
personal responsibility over government and corporate paternalism.‖ Id.  
 71. Pressure on managed care plans stemmed from consumers who ―are becoming more 
active health care participants and are demanding more choice, greater flexibility, and fewer 
restrictions on access and service delivery.‖ Draper et al., supra note 62, at 11. Following a 
short hospital stay for dehydration, Tonight Show host Jay Leno was quick to criticize his 
―really bad HMO.‖ ―[F]or X-rays, they had to take me over to Burbank Airport and put me 
through the baggage.‖ Mike Fleeman, Jay Leno Jokes About Hospitalization, PEOPLE (Apr. 27, 
2009), available at http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20275154,00.html. 
 72. Predictably, medical professionals argued that ―medical policy must derive solely 
from the physician community.‖ John Jacobi, After Managed Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers and 
Consumerism, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 397, 398 (2003). Philosophic advocates of consumer-driven 
plans assailed HMOs for purporting to know the preferences of consumers and using formulae 
and other utilization controls to control the discretion of physicians. See Robinson & Ginsburg, 
supra note 70, at w272–73.  
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providing medical insurance
73
 and were left with few alternatives: 
reducing or eliminating coverage for employees, reducing salaries or 
other benefits, or increasing employees‘ contributions toward their 
health coverage.
74
 Health care policy experts and intellectuals joined 
the fray, arguing that managed care‘s tight controls unnecessarily 
interfered with the proper functioning of medical markets.
75
 
B. Consumers Get a Choice 
In the wake of the ―backlash‖ to managed care, consumer-driven 
health care plans gained popularity.
76
 High Deductible Health Plans 
(―HDHPs‖) remove utilization and administrative controls and 
empower consumers to choose their preferred provider and receive 
the treatment that they deem necessary.
77
 Premiums are lower than in 
managed care plans, but consumers pay higher deductibles, co-
insurance and out-of-pocket expenses before triggering the support of 
their insurer.
78
 Insurers rely on consumers to create a marketplace for 
 
 73. Between 2000 and 2009, the cost of health insurance premiums paid by employers and 
insureds nearly doubled, rising to nearly $12,000 in 2007, with employees annually 
contributing an average of $3,281. See Adam Larson, The Promises and Pitfalls of Health 
Savings Accounts, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 119, 121 (2009). One possible explanation for the 
rise in premiums for managed care plans was the drive of insurers to increase enrollment in 
managed care plans by slashing premiums to make the plans more attractive to employers and 
consumers. When utilization controls proved insufficient to depress costs, insurers had to 
readjust and increase premiums. See James C. Robinson, From Managed Care To Consumer 
Health Insurance: The Fall And Rise Of Aetna, 23 HEALTH AFF. 43, 46–47 (2004). 
 74. See Robinson & Ginsburg, supra note 70, at w272–73. 
 75. See id. at w274; see also Robinson, supra note 64. 
 76. Robinson, supra note 64. It should be noted, however, that the rise of consumer-
driven health plans was not solely a response to the disadvantages of managed care plans. 
Rather, as early as the late 1980s, commentators began pushing for a health care system that 
made consumers more conscious of the costs of care and which employed managed competition 
and premium subsidies in a manner strikingly similar to reform measures that took hold in the 
following decades. See, e.g., Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health 
Plan for the 1990s, 320 N. ENG. J. MED. 29, 31–33 (1989). 
 77. See Robinson & Ginsburg, supra note 70, at w274. 
 78. See, e.g., REGINA E. HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE 281–82 (1997); 
see also Robinson, supra note 64. In a paradigmatic high-deductible consumer-driven plan, 
preventative care is not a covered expense. However, as employers and insurers recognize the 
value of preventative care, many plans provide complimentary or discounted preventative care. 
See A. Mark Fendrick & Michael E. Chernew, “Fiscally Responsible, Clinically Sensitive” 
Cost Sharing: Contain Costs While Preserving Quality, 13 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 325, 326 
(2007). 
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providers, who proponents argue will compete for the business of 
consumers like typical market actors.
79
 Evidence has shown that 
consumer sensitivity to out-of-pocket expenses and co-insurance 
reduces moral hazard and consumption of medical care.
80
 To 
consumer-choice enthusiasts, medical costs increased under managed 
care because ―[t]here is no consumer in most of the health care 
system . . . [and] users do not know the costs of the services they use, 
and the payers do not know how the users feel about them.‖81 
C. Choice Comes With a Price 
Consumer-driven health plans aren‘t without critics. Some have 
argued that health care and medical treatment fundamentally aren‘t—
or shouldn‘t be—commodities open to market forces.82 One cannot 
 
 79. ―The consumer‘s right freely to choose his or her provider would be extended to the 
provider‘s right freely to set his or her own prices.‖ Robinson & Ginsburg, supra note 70, at 
w274. 
 80. See Robinson, supra note 64. Insurers have ―renounce[d] one-size-fits-all approaches‖ 
of managed care and taken the ―focus away from the supply (physician) and toward the demand 
(consumer) side of the health care market[.]‖ Id. at 1880. An early RAND study found that total 
health care expenditures for persons in a catastrophic health plan with a large family deductible 
were 15% less than expenditures for persons with a 25% coinsurance rate. Gail A. Jensen, 
Making Room for Medical Savings Accounts in the U.S. Health Care System, in AMERICAN 
HEALTH CARE: GOVERNMENT, MARKET PROCESS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 119, 127 (Roger 
D. Feldman ed., 2000). ―A substantial body of empirical research suggests that cost-sharing at 
the point of purchase significantly reduces health care expenditures.‖ Id. Researchers found that 
the presence of higher deductibles reduced utilization, even for care that was exempt from 
deductibles and cost sharing. See Mary Reed et al., High-Deductible Health Insurance Plans: 
Efforts to Sharpen a Blunt Instrument, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1145, 1145 (2009). Increasing co-pay 
requirements by ―just a few dollars‖ has a ―marked impact‖ on prescription fill rates. Fendrick 
& Chernew, supra note 78, at 325. 
 81. See HERZLINGER, supra note 78, at 249–50. Under managed care plans, proponents of 
consumer-choice plans argue, consumers became ―complacent‖ about their health care and did 
not take time to weigh the costs and benefits of particular procedures. See Bill Brubaker, Co-
Pay or You Pay? Firms Hope Worker-Directed Health Plans Will Curb Rising Costs, WASH. 
POST, July 28, 2002, at H01. And beyond economic benefits, empowering consumers is 
intellectually consistent with the country‘s disposition toward individual choice. ―‗We shop 
around for a car, for a house, for anything else,‘[Vice President at Leesburg-based AH&T 
Technology Brokers, Inc., John] Love said. ‗But when it comes to health care, are we going to 
shop for the best price for a reconstructive surgery? Probably not.‘‖ Id. 
 82. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, TAMING THE BELOVED BEAST 94 (2009). Citing a 1963 study 
by Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, Callahan argues 
that ―health care is different from other areas of economic activity [and presents] many aspects 
that will make a good medical market hard to achieve.‖ Id. 
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place a price on a doctor‘s bedside manner or, in an emergency 
situation, shop around for the least expensive care.
83
 And, if ―good 
information‖ is the lifeblood of effective markets,84 whether 
consumers have access to and can discriminate between information 
regarding their care is an open question.
85
 While a consumer has the 
―ability to ‗Google‘ a topic and download information about the 
disease . . . the institutions required to facilitate the availability of 
information needed to enable the effective functioning of markets, in 
large part, do not exist.‖86 Furthermore, typical financial incentives 
like high deductibles and coinsurance have little impact on the 
 
 83. ROBERT A. LEVINE, SHOCK THERAPY FOR THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 7–
11 (2009). According to Levine, ―informed choice . . . is a mirage in health care.‖ Many 
patients cannot comparison shop, particularly for emergency care, because of the transaction 
costs of doing so (consumers‘ lack of expertise or mobility or the existence of a monopoly in 
the specialist community). Id. at 10–11. Furthermore, when consumers ―shop‖ for medical 
services, cost is only one of the factors that they take into account, and ―no physician wants to 
be known as the cheap provider in a community.‖ Id. at 8–9. 
 84. John Schneider & Robert Ohsfeldt, The Role of Markets and Competition in Health 
Care Reform Initiatives to Improve Efficiency and Enhance Access to Care, 37 CUMB. L. REV. 
479, 502 (2006). 
 85. See Thomas L. Greaney, Competition Policy and Organizational Fragmentation in 
Health Care, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 217 (2009). ―A central challenge‖ for reform proposals relying 
on greater consumer choice ―is finding the means to effectively channel market forces given 
many deeply embedded features of our system and the peculiar economics of health care 
delivery and financing.‖ Id. at 218. Yet, proponents of great choice in health care argue such 
channels of information will be opened when consumers are empowered to make their own 
decisions.  
At present . . . the American public clearly lacks the information it needs to choose 
among providers and insurers . . . . [But,] a consumer-controlled health care market 
would cause an explosion of such information: Surveys of health care market 
practitioners, like the Zagat restaurant surveys; Consumer Reports evaluations of 
procedures, insurers, and technology; and local equivalents of Boston magazine‘s 
annual ―Best Doctors in Boston‖ feature would mushroom.  
HERZLINGER, supra note 78, at 266. 
 86. Schneider & Ohsfeldt, supra note 84, at 503, 509. ―Health care is different from other 
areas of economic activity, presenting many aspects that will make a good medical market hard 
to achieve.‖ CALLAHAN, supra note 82, at 94. According to Callahan, the irregular and 
unpredictable demand for medical care, requirement of trust between the patient/consumer and 
doctor/seller, limited entry of consumers and providers into the field, and the patients‘ dearth of 
expertise and knowledge differentiate medical care from other consumer transactions. Id. In 
contrast, proponents of consumer-driven plans acknowledge that ―health care is not a ‗widget‘‖ 
but argue that ―there exist numerous other goods and services that are sufficiently complex that 
value and quality are not immediately transparent to those engaging in market transactions.‖ 
See Schneider & Ohsfeldt, supra note 84, at 504.  
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affluent, and some argue that ―to be truly effective with the middle 
class, deductibles and co-pays would have to be much higher.‖87 
The growth of paradigmatic HDHPs has been ―anemic,‖ and 
insurers have begun offering plans that incorporate consumer-choice 
principles without abandoning all administrative control.
88
 Health 
Savings Accounts (―HSAs‖), which received congressional sanction 
in 2003,
89
 and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs)
90
 offer 
―moderate decentralization‖ of choice whereby ―a dose of lay 
decision-making [by consumers is] superimposed on a skeleton of 
managed care.‖91 PPOs tend to provide less comprehensive care, 
averaging Actuarial Values between 80% and 84%, while an HMO 
typically covers 93% of expected medical costs.
92
 By 2008, 58% of 
consumers with employer-based health insurance enrolled in a PPO; 
8% enrolled in a consumer-driven plan with a savings option like an 
HSA.
93
 HMOs retained just 20% of consumers in employer-provided 
coverage.
94
  
 
 87. LEVINE, supra note 83, at 12. ―Of all the health care myths that are accepted as 
common wisdom by many U.S. politicians and citizens, the biggest impediment to effective 
reform appears to be the belief that market forces are the best therapy for the current crisis.‖ Id. 
―[T]he maldistribution of resources among social classes and the technical sophistication 
required for rationing choices suggest that rationing through individual purchasing decisions by 
consumers will not achieve equitable results, and that some management of care decisions will 
be necessary.‖ See Jacobi, supra note 72, at 409. 
 88. Robinson & Ginsburg, supra note 70, at w275. 
 89. See Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal Responsibility? Health Savings 
Accounts and the Future of American Health Care, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 535, 548–49 
(2005). In an HSA, employers couple a high-deductible catastrophic health plan with 
contributions to a savings account that employees use to pay for medical expenses. Id.  
 90. A PPO allows enrollees to access a wider network of physicians, though it offers 
discounts for services rendered by certain preferred providers, in exchange for a higher plan 
deductible. This freedom of access, while much greater than an HMO, is less than the high-
deductible health plan ideal and is premised on the idea that PPO plan administrators can 
extract significant concessions (and thus cost-savings) from providers seeking to receive the 
‗preferred‘ connotation. See Robinson & Ginsburg, supra note 70, at w276–77. 
 91. See Jacobi, supra note 72, at 407; see also Robinson & Ginsburg, supra note 70, at 
w275. Health Savings Accounts and Preferred Provider Organizations replace ―administrative 
controls with incentives and information‖ while using health plans as an ―important 
intermediary for structuring choices and informing enrollees about provider price and quality.‖ 
Id. 
 92. See CHRIS L. PETERSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SETTING AND 
VALUING HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS 2 (Apr. 6, 2009). 
 93. See Robinson & Ginsburg, supra note 70, at w275–76. 
 94. Id. at w276. 
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The health insurer Aetna is a prime example of the ebbing of 
managed care and emergence of health plans laced with consumer 
principles.
95
 After amassing millions of managed care enrollees at 
unsustainable pricing, Aetna was forced to hike premiums by double 
digits, a pace that it unabashedly acknowledged exceeded cost 
trends.
96
 It moved away from managing risk to ―shar[ing] risk with its 
various stakeholders‖ by hiking deductibles and out-of-pocket 
expenses.
97
 And it left the door open to further changes ―if and when 
[employers] became willing to face the resulting backlash from 
beneficiaries.‖98 In just three years, Aetna cut the number of HMO 
enrollees by over 50%—a total of 4.45 million individuals—and its 
total insurance enrollment dropped by 55%.
99
 Enrollment in its PPO 
plan, however, slid just 9% over the same span.
100
 
III. ―HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM IS THE LAW OF THE LAND‖101 
On March 23, 2010, after a lengthy and tumultuous campaign for 
reform,
102
 President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and 
 
 95. See Robinson, supra note 73, at 45–48. 
 96. Id. at 47.  
 97. Id. at 48. 
 98. Id. at 48–49 
 99. Id. at 51. 
 100. Id. 
 101. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Health Insurance Reform, 
Univ. of Iowa Field House, Iowa City, Iowa (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-health-insurance-reform-university-iowa-
field-house-iowa-city-iow. 
 102. Among other complaints, Republican opponents to the reform measure characterized 
it as a ―job-killing government takeover of health care.‖ Office of Rep. John Boehner, Blog: 
Ten Facts Every American Should Know About Democrats’ Final Government Takeover of 
Health Care (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.johnboehner.house.gov/blog/?postid=177141. 
Citizens outside the Capitol building protesting on the eve of the bill‘s passage accused 
Democratic leaders of being communists, socialists, and putting America on the path of 
―government tyranny.‖ Dana Milbank, The Republicans Who Stirred the Tea, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 22, 2010, at A1. When the bill passed the U.S. House of Representatives, it failed to 
receive a single Republican vote, the first time that a major piece of social legislation passed on 
a completely partisan vote. See Dan Balz, Historic Win or Not, Democrats Could Pay a Price, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2010, at A1. Opposition to the reform bill remains fervent; ten months 
after its passage, Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives voted to repeal the 
Affordable Care Act. See David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, House Votes for Repeal of 
Health Law in Symbolic Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2011, at A1. 
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Affordable Care Act into law.
103
 While trumpeting the Act as ―major 
reform,‖104 the President maintained that it preserved ―choice‖ and 
―competition‖ for private health care plans while maintaining the 
existing employer-based system.
105
 Reform was necessary, the 
Obama administration asserted, to provide security for Americans 
―who right now face bankruptcy because of unpaid health bills.‖106 In 
the face of withering Republican criticism,
107
 President Obama 
defended the legislation, citing the effect that medical costs had on 
even medically insured individuals, some of whom ―have gone 
bankrupt because of health care.‖108  
The Affordable Care Act attempts to reduce or limit consumers‘ 
share of medical costs in a variety of ways. First, the Act expands 
coverage to an estimated 32 million uninsured individuals and 
 
 103. The bill signed by President Obama on March 23, 2010 was substantially altered by 
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, which was signed into law on March 30, 
2010. Passage of the reform measures required a ―legislative two-step‖ as a result of Senate 
parliamentary rules. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Jeff Zeleny & Carl Hulse, Health Vote Caps a 
Journey Back From the Brink, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, at A1. The U.S. Senate initially 
passed a reform opposed by many House of Representatives Democrats. House Democrats 
sought to modify the Senate bill but soon realized, after the election of Republican Scott Brown 
to the Massachusetts Senate seat previously held by the late Senator Ted Kennedy, a Democrat, 
that Senate Democrats would no longer hold the 60 votes necessary to prevent a Republican 
filibuster and pass the amended House bill. Thus, House Democrats passed the Senate‘s bill, 
setting the stage for President Obama‘s signing of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act on March 23, 2010. The House then passed the Reconciliation Act, which modified the 
Affordable Care Act, in a procedural move that only required a simple majority vote in the 
Senate. Id.  
 104. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the House Vote on Health 
Insurance Reform (Mar. 22, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
remarks-president-house-vote-health-insurance-reform. 
 105. Id.; see also Ewen MacAskill & Andrew Clark, Healthcare Bill: Obama Sets Out on 
Journey to Sell His Health Reforms to US People, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Mar. 23, 2010, at 
16.  
 106. MacAskill & Clark, supra note 105. President Obama, at a rally a week before signing 
the Affordable Care Act, cited increasing out-of-pocket expenses as requiring reform. ―And 
even if you‘ve got good health insurance, what‘s happening to your premiums? What‘s 
happening to your co-payments? What‘s happening to your deductible? They‘re all going up 
. . . . So the bottom line is this: The status quo on health care is simply unsustainable.‖ President 
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Health Care Reform in Strongsville, Ohio (Mar. 
15, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-health-
care-reform-strongsville-ohio. 
 107. See supra note 102. 
 108. President Barack Obama, Opening Remarks at the White House Health Summit (Feb. 
25, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/ 
AR2010022502334.html. 
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families by enacting an individual mandate to carry health insurance, 
imposing penalties on certain businesses that do not offer health 
insurance to its workers, and providing subsidies for individuals who 
cannot afford to purchase health insurance.
109
 Second, the Act 
requires states to create health insurance ―exchanges‖ where 
individuals can shop for private health insurance plans, which must 
meet certain benefit and cost-sharing requirements in order to be sold 
in the exchange.
110
 Third, the Act imposes new limits on private 
insurance plans, including prohibiting annual and lifetime benefit 
caps and requiring insurance companies to spend 80 to 85 cents of 
every premium dollar on medical expenses.
111
 
A. Expanding Coverage to Uninsured 
The Affordable Care Act expands health insurance coverage to an 
estimated 32 million Americans by imposing a mandate
112
 requiring 
citizens to purchase qualifying health insurance coverage by 2014 
and by penalizing large businesses that do not offer health insurance 
benefits to its employees.
113
 Uninsured individuals and families with 
 
 109. See infra notes 112–22 and accompanying text. 
 110. See infra notes 137–41 and accompanying text. 
 111. See infra notes 130–36 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 
§ 1501; The White House Blog, The Affordable Care Act Helps America’s Uninsured (Sept. 16, 
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/09/16/affordable-care-act-helps-
america-s-uninsured. Exceptions to the insurance mandate will be granted for financial hardship 
including for individuals for whom the lowest cost plan would exceed 8% of income and those 
whose income was below the tax filing threshold ($9,350 for taxpayers under 65 and $18,700 
for couples). Exceptions will also be granted for religious objections, to American Indians, 
those without coverage for less than three months, undocumented immigrants in the United 
States, and individuals in jail or prison. See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, FOCUS ON HEALTH 
REFORM: SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW 1 (Apr. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf [hereinafter SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH 
REFORM LAW]. 
 113. Individuals and families who fail to obtain coverage by 2014 will be required to pay a 
penalty equal to the greater of $95 per person or 1% of taxable income, with penalties 
increasing in 2016 to $750 per person (with a family maximum of $2,085) or a 2.5% fee on 
taxable income. Id. Businesses that do not offer coverage but have more than 50 employees, at 
least one of which is full-time and receives an Affordable Care Act premium tax credit, will be 
assessed a fee of $2,000 per full-time employee, excluding the first 30 employees. Id. If the 
employer offers insurance but at least one employee still receives a premium tax credit, the 
employer will pay the lesser of $3,000 for each employee receiving a credit or $2,000 for each 
full-time employee. Id. The federal government has taken pains to describe these provisions as 
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income up to 400% of the Federal Poverty Level
114
 or whose 
employers‘ coverage fails to meet minimum standards115 will receive 
subsidies to reduce the cost of obtaining coverage.
116
 In concrete 
terms, a family of four, with a forty year-old policyholder earning 
$40,000 per year, will receive a $10,148 tax credit and will be 
required to pay $1,982 (4.95% of income) for the remaining annual 
premium.
117
 Individuals who fail to obtain coverage by 2014 will be 
subject to a tax penalty.
118
 Additional subsides will be available to 
reduce out-of-pocket expenses for individuals and families with 
income up to 400% of the Federal Poverty Level.
119
 These subsidies 
will raise the Actuarial Value of eligible recipients‘ plans, which 
reduces the recipients‘ total financial liability for medical claims.120 
 
not an employer ―mandate‖ to provide insurance but rather a ―shared responsibility fee‖ for 
those employers that fail to provide health insurance. See Newsroom: Increasing Choice and 
Saving Money for Small Businesses, HEALTHCARE.GOV (June 27, 2010), http://www.healthcare 
.gov/news/factsheets/increasing_choice_and_saving_money_for_small_businesses.html.  
 114. The 2011 Federal Poverty Level (FPL) was $10,890 for individuals and $22,350 for a 
family of four. See 76 Fed. Reg. 3637, 3638 (Jan. 20, 2011). 
 115. ―Employees who are offered coverage by an employer are not eligible for premium 
credits unless the employer plan does not have actuarial value of at least 60% or if the employee 
share of the premium exceeds 9.5% of income.‖ See SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM 
LAW, supra note 112, at 2. For a definition of actuarial values, see infra note 120. 
 116. Premium tax credits will be refundable (available to individuals who do not have tax 
liability) and advanceable (available to the consumer before they purchase coverage and not 
requiring the consumer to wait to be reimbursed). See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, 
EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM: QUESTIONS ABOUT HEALTH INSURANCE SUBSIDIES 2 
(Apr. 2010), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7962-02.pdf. The credits 
reduce insurance premiums to a percentage of individual or family income. Id. at 1. The percent 
of income paid toward premiums will range from 3–4% of income (for purchasers with income 
133–150% FPL) to 9.5% of income (for purchasers with income 300–400% FPL). Id. 
 117. See Health Reform Subsidy Calculator, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, 
http://healthreform.kff.org/Subsidycalculator.aspx (enter income as ―2014 dollars,‖ annual 
income of ―40,000,‖ age as ―40,‖ family type of ―family of 4,‖ employee coverage of ―no,‖ and 
regional cost factor of ―medium‖) (last visited Nov. 6, 2011). 
 118. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 119. See SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note 112, at 2. Subsidies will 
vary according to income. Individuals with income 100–150% of the FPL will have their plans‘ 
Actuarial Value increased to 94%; 150–200% FPL will rise to 87%; 200–250% will rise to 
73%; and 250–400% FPL to 70%. Id. 
 120. Actuarial value (AV) is a standard metric for comparing the percentage of medical 
claims paid out by a health plan and the percentage of out-of-pocket expenses borne by the 
consumer. See ROLAND MCDEVITT, CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, ACTUARIAL 
VALUE: A METHOD FOR COMPARING HEALTH PLAN BENEFITS 3–5 (Oct. 2008), available at 
http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/H/PDF%20HealthPlanAcu 
arialValue.pdf. AVs are expressed as a share of all medical expenses; a plan with an AV of .75 
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As a ―bridge‖ to the 2014 enactment of these provisions, the 
Affordable Care Act established a health plan for uninsured 
individuals who were denied private health coverage because of pre-
existing conditions.
121
 Yet, as of November 2010, just 8,000 
Americans had enrolled in the plan.
122
 
B. Minimum Benefit Packages and Health Care Exchanges 
Citing the need for ―balance‖ between more affordable, higher 
deductible health plans and comprehensive plans with rich benefits, 
President Obama called for a set of minimum benefit standards that 
all new health plans must meet.
123
 Under the Affordable Care Act, all 
new plans must meet at least the ―bronze tier‖ of coverage,124 provide 
 
would indicate that the insurer covers 75% of expenses. Id. at 3. The Affordable Care Act sets 
maximum out-of-pocket spending limits for health plans, see infra note 126, but does not 
specify the combination of deductibles, co-payments and co-insurance a plan can deploy to 
meet its actuarial value requirements. See QUESTIONS ABOUT HEALTH INSURANCE SUBSIDIES, 
supra note 116, at 2. Combined with the overall limit on out-of-pocket expenses, the subsidies 
increase the AV of a recipient‘s health plan and thus act to limit his or her total out-of-pocket 
liability. Id. at 2–3. 
 121. See Newsroom: State by State Enrollment in the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance 
Plan, as of November 1, 2010, HEALTHCARE.GOV (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.healthcare.gov/ 
news/factsheets/pre-existing_condition_insurance_enrollment.html; see also JEAN HALL & 
JANICE MOORE, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, PRE-EXISTING CONDITION INSURANCE PLANS 
CREATED BY THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010, at 2 (Oct. 2010), available at http://www. 
commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2010/Oct/1445_Hall_PCIPs
_and_the_ACA_ib_FINAL.pdf. 
 122. See State by State Enrollment in the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan, supra 
note 121. 
 123. Obama noted, 
So the general idea has been here that we should set up some minimum standards 
within the exchange, that a plan that people are buying into, whether it's a small 
business or an individual, should be at least solid enough that if your kid got sick, 
they're actually going to be treated, that if something happened that you weren't left 
with a huge bunch of out-of-pocket costs. It is true that you can always get cheaper 
insurance if it has really high deductibles or really high copayments or doesn't cover as 
many things. And so there has to be a balance that's struck there.  
President Barack Obama, Remarks at the White House Health Summit (Feb. 25, 2010), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR201002250 
2860.html. 
 124. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302, 124 Stat. 119, 167–168 (2010). The four tiers—Bronze, 
Silver, Gold and Platinum—are distinguished primarily on the percentage of claims covered by 
the plans. Bronze plans must have an Actuarial Value of .6; Silver of .7; Gold of .8; and 
Platinum of .9.  
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an essential health benefits package,
125
 and cap out-of-pocket 
expenses to the current Health Savings Account limits ($5,950 
annually for individuals and $11,900 for families).
126
 Plans existing 
prior to the enactment of the Affordable Care Act on March 23, 2010 
will be exempt from these benefit standards but will be subject to 
other new regulations.
127
 ―Grandfather‖ exceptions will continue only 
so long as those plans do not make ―significant changes‖ in benefit 
packages or costs for consumers.
128
 The Congressional Budget Office 
estimates that by 2013 as few as 20% of employer-based plans might 
 
 125. Id. §§ 1301–1302. All health plans, except grandfathered plans, infra note 128, must 
cover a comprehensive set of medical services and qualify for the ―Bronze‖ tier of health plans. 
While the Department of Health & Human Services is empowered to define the minimum set of 
benefits that all plans must provide, the Act expressly requires that all plans cover: ambulatory 
services, emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and 
substance use disorder services, prescription drugs, rehabilitative services and devices, 
laboratory services, preventive and wellness services, chronic disease management, and 
pediatric services, including oral and vision care. See Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1302(b), 124 Stat. 
119, 163–165 (2010). The Department of Health and Human Services has largely passed on the 
opportunity to add a list of additional services that all health plans must provide in order to be a 
―qualified health plan.‖ Rather, in proposed rules announced in July 2011, the Department of 
Health and Human Services gave states the authority to determine what minimum set of 
benefits a plan must provide in order for the plan to be offered through the state health plan 
exchange. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and 
Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41866, 41921 (proposed July 15, 2011) (to be codified at 
45 C.F.R. pt. 155). In effect, a state may require that all health plans provide a very specific or 
an expansive set of benefits in order to be offered to consumers in the exchange. Or a state may 
passively permit all health plans, regardless of the skimpiness of the benefit package, be offered 
in an exchange so long as the insurer can show some evidence that the plan meets the required 
actuarial value requirement for the given tier. This choice, which greatly affects whether 
insurers can offer truly low-benefit, high-deductible plans, will be determined state-by-state. 
See infra note 140. 
 126. Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1302(c), 124 Stat. 119, 165–167 (2010). Qualifying plans must 
also report cost-sharing requirements and out-of-network and claims payment information in 
plain language. 
 127. See infra notes 129–35 and accompanying text. 
 128. See 75 Fed. Reg. 34538, 34547 (June 17, 2010). To retain grandfathered status, health 
plans cannot significantly reduce benefits, raise deductibles, co-insurance or co-payment 
charges, lower employers‘ premium contribution, or tighten or add limits on the amount the 
insurer will pay for covered services. The ―grandfather‖ provision was a cornerstone of 
President Obama‘s pledge throughout the debate leading up to passage of the Affordable Care 
Act. The president promised Americans that if you ―like your health plan, you can keep it.‖ See 
Newsroom: Keeping the Health Plan You Have: The Affordable Care Act and “Grandfathered” 
Health Plans, HEALTHCARE.GOV (June 14, 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/ 
06/20100614c.html. 
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remain grandfathered and thus exempt from the Act‘s minimum 
benefits requirements.
129
 
In September 2010, regulations went into effect prohibiting all 
health plans—grandfathered or not—from placing lifetime limits on 
coverage, rescinding coverage when enrollees make unintentional 
errors on application forms or become ill, denying coverage to 
children with pre-existing conditions, and from placing annual limits 
on coverage below set targets.
130
 Beginning in 2011, insurers will be 
required to spend 80 cents of every premium dollar from individual 
and small group plans and 85 cents of every large group plan 
premium on medical care and quality improvement.
131
 Rebates will 
be provided to consumers whose plans fail to meet the required 
ratio.
132
 Beginning in 2011, all non-grandfathered individual and 
small group plans seeking to hike premiums by over 10% will have to 
submit the proposed increase to a board that will review the increase 
for reasonableness.
133
 In 2012, state-specific levels will be set 
 
 129. See Fact Sheet: Keeping the Health Plan You Have: The Affordable Care Act and 
“Grandfathered” Health Plans, HEALTHCARE.GOV (June 14, 2010), http://www.healthreform. 
gov/newsroom/keeping_the_health_plan_you_have.html.  
 130. Id.  
 131. See Medical Loss Ratio: Getting Your Money's Worth on Health Insurance, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/medical_loss_ 
ratio.html. Medical loss ratio is a comparison of premium dollars spent on medical care and 
those spent on administrative costs, including profit, overhead and marketing. Id. The National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) was tasked with crafting definitions of 
qualifying medical expenses, which the Department of Health & Human Services adopted 
wholesale. See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Letter to Department of 
Health & Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.naic.org/ 
documents/committees_ex_mlr_reg_asadopted.pdf. 
 132. See Medical Loss Ratio, supra note 131. The Obama administration estimates that by 
2012, up to 12 million Americans could be eligible for rebates totaling $1.4 billion. Rick 
Newman, Why Health Insurers Make Lousy Villains, U.S. NEWS, Aug. 25, 2009, 
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/flowchart/2009/08/25/why-health-insurers-make-lousy-
villains. Critics of the reform measure, however, cite the health insurance industry‘s ―modest‖ 
3.4% profit margin as evidence that premium increases are not a sign of abusive industry 
practices. See id. One health policy expert predicted that insurers would, in response, ―gut‖ cost 
containment programs and ―avoid the administrative expenses of managing care.‖ Amy 
Goldstein, HHS Issues Rules Governing Insurers’ Overhead, Spending, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 
2010, at A03. 
 133. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, RATE REVIEW: SPOTLIGHT ON STATE EFFORTS TO 
MAKE HEALTH INSURANCE MORE AFFORDABLE 6 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
healthreform/upload/8122.pdf. Increases above 10% are not presumed unreasonable, but 
insurers must make publicly available information justifying the increase. Id. 
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marking the threshold above which insurers must justify premium 
increases.
134
 Additionally, ―Cadillac‖ health plans, or those with 
annual premiums in excess of $10,200 (for individuals) or $27,500 
(for families) will be subject to a 40% excise tax.
135
 The tax is 
intended to discourage employers from siphoning otherwise taxable 
employee compensation into untaxed health benefits and to reduce 
utilization by increasing the employees‘ share of health care costs.136 
In 2014, new state-based health insurance ―exchanges‖ will be 
established for individuals and businesses to shop for qualifying 
health plans.
137
 Lower-income individuals and families seeking to use 
tax credits to subsidize their health plan must enroll in a plan through 
an exchange.
138
 The exchanges are intended to promote competition 
among private health insurers by establishing a one-stop shop for 
consumers to access information about health plans, thereby reducing 
transaction costs, improving transparency, and increasing consumer 
accessibility to a variety of health plans.
139
 Yet, the federal 
government has left to the states a critical decision that may 
significantly bear on the success of Affordable Care Act to reduce 
medically related bankruptcies. In rules issued by the Department of 
Health and Human Services, the federal government will let states 
decide whether exchanges should be ―active purchasers‖ of health 
care plans, in which exchanges would extract concessions from 
insurers (like more expansive benefit packages or reduced 
deductibles) before allowing the insurer‘s health plan to be offered in 
the exchange, or whether the exchange ought to be an ―open 
marketplace‖ that permissively allows all health plans that meet the 
 
 134. Shining a Light on Health Insurance Rate Increases, HEALTHCARE.GOV (Dec. 21, 
2010), http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/ratereview.html. 
 135. KAREN DAVIS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, STARTING ON THE PATH TO A 
HIGH PERFORMANCE HEALTH SYSTEM: ANALYSIS OF THE PAYMENT AND SYSTEM REFORM 
PROVISIONS IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010, 21 (Sept. 
2010), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20 
Report/2010/Sep/1442_Davis_Payment%20and%20System%20Reform_923v2.pdf. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See 76 Fed. Reg. 41866 (July 15, 2011); see also Health Insurance Exchanges: State 
Planning and Establishment Grants, HEALTHCARE.GOV (July 29, 2010), http://www.healthcare 
.gov/news/factsheets/esthealthinsurexch.html.  
 138. See SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note 112, at 2. 
 139. Health Insurance Exchanges: State Planning and Establishment Grants, supra note 
137. 
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Affordable Care Act‘s minimal requirements to be sold in the 
exchange.
140
  
As a result, while an exchange may be a vehicle for offering 
choice to consumers, unless a state is willing to strongly regulate the 
plans offered in its exchange, the exchange will not necessarily 
protect consumers from the dangers of skimpy, higher-deductible 
plans.
141
 
IV. DEATH, TAXES, AND MEDICAL EXPENSES 
There is a little doubt that the Affordable Care Act will reduce the 
overall number of medical bankruptcies. Eliminating annual and 
lifetime caps and coverage rescissions immediately protects those 
who contract the most serious and expensive illnesses.
142
 And 
enrolling individuals in a basic health plan and capping out-of-pocket 
expenses could save the previously uninsured over $15,000 in 
uncovered medical expenses.
143
 Even so, in addressing medical 
bankruptcy, these costs are the low hanging fruit.
144
 What remains is 
 
 140. The Affordable Care Act requires that state exchanges certify that all health plans 
offered in the exchange meet minimal benefit and cost-sharing requirements laid out in the Act. 
See supra note 124. Yet, regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human 
Services do not set a methodology for a state exchange to certify whether a health plan‘s benefit 
package meets the minimum requirements to be offered on a given tier. Rather, the regulations 
go no further than the plain language of the Act, giving exchanges discretion to certify any plan 
that meets two minimal qualifications: (i) if the health insurance issuer has provided evidence 
that the plan complies with the minimum benefit package; and (ii) if offering the plan in the 
exchange is in the interest of the consumers and employers. See 76 Fed. Reg. 41866, 41921 
(July 15, 2011). While regulators suggest factors that states ought to consider in determining 
whether offering a particular health plan is in the interest of consumers and employers, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 41892, the choice is up to each state exchange. Presumably, a state could determine that 
offering the widest possible selection of health plans is in the consumers‘ best interest. The state 
could then approve all health plans, no matter how questionable the benefit package or how 
likely the consumer will be liable for out-of-pocket expenses, to be offered in the exchange. In 
this event, the exchanges—in the hands of states that politically oppose the Affordable Care Act 
and are reluctant to exercise regulatory authority under the Act‘s banner—will do little to 
prevent consumers from falling victim to potentially skimpy health plans. 
 141. See supra note 140. 
 142. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
 143. Before the Affordable Care Act, uninsured families averaged $26,971 in medical 
expenses. See supra note 39. Under the Affordable Care Act, out-of-pocket medical expenses 
for familes are capped at $11,900 (before subsidies), resulting in potential savings of $15,000 
for a previously uninsured family. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text. 
 144. The tragic case of a person who loses his insurance because he lost his job, falls ill, 
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the thornier predicament: what effect will the Affordable Care Act 
have on families that are fully insured but are hard hit by out-of-
pocket and indirect medical expenses that drag down a sagging 
budget?
145
 Because the Affordable Care Act retains the ―competitive‖ 
private structure of the health care industry,
146
 an industry that 
increasingly relies on consumer sensitivity to out-of-pocket expenses, 
the Affordable Care Act cannot and will not completely eliminate 
medical bankruptcy. 
As extensive research illustrates, procuring health insurance alone 
is not the cure for medical bankruptcy.
147
 Rather, the collision of out-
of-pocket expenses and financial insecurity thrust on insured families 
when illness or injury strikes is most frequently the source of 
financial ruin.
148
 The Affordable Care Act does successfully chip 
away at this particular crisis. The Act‘s limits on out-of-pocket 
expenses reduce an insured‘s financial liability149 and substantially 
aid eligible individuals by distributing subsidies that further reduce 
their out-of-pocket costs.
150
 The out-of-pocket limits, $5,950 for 
individuals and $11,900 for families, are noteworthy improvements 
over the nearly $18,000 in annual expenses paid by the average 
medically bankrupt family.
151
 However, the out-of-pocket limits 
apply only to new and not grandfathered health plans.
152
 While it is 
likely only a matter of time before all plans lose grandfathered status, 
many insurers—particularly those like Aetna that cut managed care 
plan premiums in order to entice consumers
153—will be left with little 
 
and who subsequently files for bankruptcy makes a compelling case for passage of a reform 
bill. See supra note 106. However, the uninsured (at illness onset) represent just 20% of 
medical bankruptcy filers. See supra note 23. 
 145. See supra notes 30–42. 
 146. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra notes 28–29. 
 148. See supra notes 31–42. 
 149. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text. However, the subsidies reducing out-
of-pocket liability will apply only to families earning less than 400% of the Federal Poverty 
Level, which would be $43,560 for individuals and $89,400 for families. See supra notes 114, 
119. The financial liability for out-of-pocket expenses may remain significant for many middle 
class families. See infra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 151. Compare supra note 126 with supra notes 32–36. 
 152. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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choice but to hike premiums to remain profitable and, in doing so, 
will lose grandfathered protection. In the meantime, however, 
millions of consumers will be left for years without a cap on 
exorbitant out-of-pocket limits.
154
 
Most notably, the out-of-pocket limits do not consider the indirect 
expenses of an illness or injury.
155
 While an insured‘s exposure to 
some of the most staggering medical costs, like hospital bills, are 
capped under the Affordable Care Act, transportation, child care and 
other indirect expenses are not.
156
 These costs are not insignificant 
and in some cases amount to over half of total out-of-pocket 
expenses.
157
 When the ―double whammy‖ of an illness hits—rising 
medical costs meeting reduced income—even the Affordable Care 
Act‘s out-of-pocket cap will be insufficient to protect against a 
budgetary crunch all too familiar to many low- and middle-income 
families.
158
  
Forebodingly, all signs point toward policyholders bumping up 
against the out-of-pocket maximums. First, the Affordable Care Act 
will only serve to encourage an industry that is hurtling towards 
higher deductible consumer-driven health plans.
159
 With nearly 32 
million uninsured consumers newly entering the health care 
marketplace,
160
 consumer-driven plans—and their reduced 
premiums—will be attractive to consumers seeking plans with a low 
sticker price.
161
 Second, the ―Cadillac‖ tax will render obsolete the 
 
 154. See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text. 
 155. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.  
 156. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.  
 157. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra notes 37–42. Additionally, the credit costs of paying for direct and indirect 
expenses will also remain a significant burden on families with few savings. See supra notes 
46–48. The reduction in out-of-pocket liability will play a significant role in reducing these 
costs. Borrowing a smaller amount of principal on credit logically results in less interest owed. 
Yet, whether running a $15,000 balance or $5,950 (the out-of-pocket maximum for an 
individual health plan), the interest owed will remain significant and increase the individual‘s 
cost of financing medical care. 
 159. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra note 78. The health exchanges may actually work to exacerbate this 
problem. While the exchanges will create a marketplace where consumers can more easily 
compare health plan benefits and costs, see supra note 139, consumers facing a mandate to 
purchase a plan and armed without much in the way of expertise in health plans may simply opt 
for the least expensive plan. The low premiums of high deductible plans will, in this simplistic 
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most comprehensive plans with the lowest out-of-pocket liability for 
a consumer.
162
 Third, opposition to the restrictive utilization controls 
of managed care
163
 will increase the popularity of high-deductible 
consumer-driven plans to consumers newly entering the 
marketplace.
164
 Citizens now required by law to enroll in a health 
plan are likely to have strong objections to an insurer tightly 
managing the care for which he or she is required to pay.
165
 Finally, 
insurers have been placed in a governmental vice, squeezed at the 
front end by a public review process of premium increases and, at the 
back end by requirements to spend upwards of 85% of premiums on 
medical services.
166
 In order to preserve a profit margin and fund 
marketing and other overhead expenses, insurers will have little 
choice, on account of these twin pressures, but to gut their health 
plans of the administrative controls on which managed care plans 
rely.
167 
These factors suggest that the health care industry will 
increasingly market and rely on higher deductible health plans and 
continue shifting costs onto consumers, stopped only by the 
Affordable Care Act‘s out-of-pocket limits.  
 
scenario, be more attractive to the consumer. Savvy consumers who are heavy consumers of 
health care may (and hopefully do) opt for more comprehensive rather than high-deductible 
plans. Yet, this may serve to widen the price gap between comprehensive and high deductible 
plans: by choosing comprehensive health plans in large numbers, heavy health care consumers 
would pollute the plan‘s risk pool and increase the cost of insuring the group. The logical result 
would be higher premiums, which would further exacerbate the price gap between 
comprehensive and high deductible plans, which would have less expensive risk pools. Testing 
whether this phenomenon materializes after health exchanges are launched will be an important 
insight into the future growth of high deductible plans. 
 162. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 70–75 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra note 112. With opposition to the reform bill strong nearly a year after its 
passage, see supra note 102, it is not fanciful to imagine a scenario where citizens—required by 
law to purchase health insurance—may cast blame on the Obama administration for the faults 
and difficulties of health plans (like the utilization controls of managed care plans) that they 
purchased through the health plan exchanges. 
 166. See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text. 
 167. High deductible plans leave the transaction costs—searching for and selecting 
physicians, for example—to consumers, supra note 77, and rely on consumers and not 
expensive administrative controls to drive down costs. See supra note 132 and accompanying 
text. 
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A. Race to the Bottom? 
In the aftermath of the Affordable Care Act‘s full implementation 
in 2014, with out-of-pocket expenses reaching maximum allowable 
levels,
168
 insurers will likely begin a race to the bottom. Benefit 
packages will be cut and riddled with deductibles and co-insurance 
requirements to increase insurer profitability and to woo new buyers 
seeking low premium plans.
169
 President Obama recognized this 
possibility and wisely called for minimum standards that will help to 
ensure that health coverage is more than merely illusory.
170
 Even so, 
despite subsidies, the expense of allowable out-of-pocket costs under 
the Affordable Care Act and the indirect costs of medical care are 
sufficient to drain the budgets of low to middle income families.  
A family of four, with an annual income of $50,000, is 
responsible for $3,385 in premiums and, if stricken with illness or 
injury, could face up to $6,250 in total out-of-pocket liability, 
chewing up nearly 20% of pretax income, even before factoring in 
indirect expenses.
171
 Surveys found that, before the Affordable Care 
Act, 90% of debtors had medical debt in excess of just 10% of pretax 
income.
172
 Thus, even after the applying the Affordable Care Act 
caps on out-of-pocket expenses, many families may find themselves 
facing the familiar prospect of mounting medical bills and 
consequent bankruptcy. 
The steps required to avoid this result are undesirable. Congress 
must avoid using its newfound authority to modify the ―minimum 
benefits package‖ in an attempt to legislate away sources of 
consumer strain and expense.
173
 Doing so would risk making the 
 
 168. See supra notes 159–68 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra note 161. While health plans offered through the exchanges must display 
basic information relating to a health plan‘s coverage and out-of-pocket requirements, see supra 
note 126, the learning curve of many consumers—whether previously uninsured or insured—
will be steep and knowledge of differences in coverage may be limited. 
 170. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra note 117. 
 172. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 173. For example, Congress could require that insurers exempt certain procedures or 
treatment for particular diseases from those requiring cost sharing. Alternatively, Congress 
could, in determining the minimum essential benefits package that all health plans must satisfy 
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essential health benefits package, designed to be the floor under 
which no health plan can venture, a political football.
174
 Few 
politicians could be expected to vote against the emotional overtures 
of patients seeking expanded coverage for more advanced, risky and 
expensive treatments.
175
 Furthermore, mandates that health plans 
include coverage for a host of expensive treatments would require 
insurers to resort to the unpopular tight utilization controls of 
managed care. If faced with a legal obligation to cover expensive care 
and difficulty raising revenues to pay for the coverage,
176
 insurers 
would have little choice but to depress the number of procedures with 
managed care style controls or to refuse to offer plans through the 
health exchanges.  
Furthermore, government efforts to eliminate consumers‘ out-of-
pocket liability are impracticable. Consumer-driven plans rely on out-
of-pocket expenses and deductibles to drive consumer behavior.
177
 
Insulating consumers from the effect of their health care decisions, 
which is the practical effect of aspiring to eliminate medical 
bankruptcy in the current health care system, removes market-based 
tools from the insurance industry‘s belt. While subsidies that reduce 
(but do not eliminate) out-of-pocket liability are necessary to ensure 
that all families, regardless of income, have access to health care, 
 
to be offered through an exchange, require an ever-growing list of procedures be covered by the 
base package. 
 174. Should Congress go down the path of adding specific mandatory coverage 
requirements, the Affordable Care Act may become the de facto government ―takeover‖ of the 
health care industry that many conservatives feared. See supra note 102. At present under the 
Affordable Care Act, the federal government has control over how premium dollars are spent, 
supra note 131, reviews private insurers‘ efforts to raise revenue, supra note 132, and, for new 
plans, requires that a minimum set of benefits be provided. See supra note 125. If Congress 
specifies exactly what an insurer may charge a consumer for certain procedures or whether 
certain procedures will be covered without any out-of-pocket expense, insurers will be left with 
little room to make private business decisions on coverage, revenue, or payment schemes. The 
federal government is already taking steps in this direction: insurers must now provide 
preventative services for women (like contraception and well-women visits) without charging 
women a co-pay, co-insurance or deductible. See Affordable Care Act Ensures Women Receive 
Preventative Services at No Additional Cost, HHS.GOV (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.hhs.gov/ 
news/press/2011pres/08/20110801b.html. 
 175. Imagine a child afflicted with a rare form of cancer, which is very expensive to treat, 
lobbying Congress to require insurers to pay for 100% of treatment costs. 
 176. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra notes 77–81, 88–94 and accompanying text. 
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government subsidies should not be used to insulate individuals from 
their own poor decisions.  
If death and taxes are life‘s great certainties,178 then illness and 
medical expenses are foreseeable antecedents. Families must prepare 
for the inevitable illness or injury by saving and making good health 
and personal finance decisions. Of course, high-deductible consumer-
driven plans could have a disproportionate effect on lower-income 
family finances,
179
 which is a threat that needs to be carefully 
monitored. Yet, alternatives to consumer-driven plans, like managed 
care, require higher premiums that may exceed family budgets and 
become a bar to acquiring insurance in the first place. If out-of-
pocket expenses were eliminated all together for low-income 
families, an unrealistically expensive proposition,
180
 then the lurking 
dangers of moral hazard and a vitriolic political response would be 
overwhelming.
181
 
 
 178. See 1 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, WILLIAM TEMPLE & WILLIAM DUANE, MEMOIRS OF 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 619 (1837). 
 179. The gap of information that opponents cite as a great fault of consumer-driven health 
plans might be most pernicious in more poorly educated and low-income households. See supra 
notes 82–86 and accompanying text. A more poorly educated individual may struggle to 
analyze complex health care decisions and search for competing providers, skills that 
consumer-driven health plans rely on to create a vibrant health care marketplace. See, e.g., 
Fabian Lange, The Role of Education in Complex Health Decisions: Evidence From Cancer 
Screening, 30 J. HEALTH ECON. 43, 43–44 (Jan. 2011) (establishing that the educated make 
better-informed decisions regarding cancer screening and that educated women were more 
receptive to scientific evidence and held fewer nonscientific beliefs).  
 180. It would cost the federal government an additional $4,167 to eliminate out-of-pocket 
expenses for a family of four headed by a forty-year-old wage earner with a $40,000 annual 
income. See Health Reform Subsidy Calculator, supra note 117. This cost would be on top of 
the $10,148 annual tax credit the family would receive to subsidize the purchase of a health 
plan. Thus, while dependent on the income of each family or individual receiving tax credits, 
shielding lower-income families from liability for out-of-pocket expenses could increase the 
costs on the federal government by as much as 40%. Id. 
 181. In a health care system where the government paid all out-of-pocket expenses, 
consumers would have no financial reason to refrain from utilizing care, fitting the classic case 
of moral hazard. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Furthermore, Republican critics of 
the Affordable Care Act, who already believed that the reform measure was a government 
takeover of the private health care system, see supra note 102, would have a stronger argument 
if the government paid all out-of-pocket expenses for many families. By subsidizing premiums 
and out-of-pocket expenses, the federal government would yield enormous purchasing power in 
a large segment of the private health insurance industry, which, in addition to such public 
programs as Medicare and Medicaid, would give the federal government significant bargaining 
power against private health insurers. This prospect violates the core principles of consumer-
driven health plans. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
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B. Inevitable Bankruptcies 
While the Affordable Care Act preserves policyholders‘ 
responsibility for some medical costs, it offers protection from 
morally reprehensible industry behavior that strips ill or injured 
individuals of care when they are most vulnerable.
182
 No longer will 
lack of insurance as a result of unemployment be a death sentence to 
family finances.
183
 Abolition of annual and lifetime benefit caps 
ensures that individuals stricken with the most serious diseases 
receive care free of economic worry.
184
 However, in the present 
health care system, the Affordable Care Act cannot and should not 
protect consumers from their own bad choices.  
For society to reap the benefits of a health care system where 
individuals enjoy greater choice, there must be consequences for poor 
decisions. Family budgeting decisions, failure to take advantage of 
wellness and preventative care, and utilization of care from expensive 
providers are individual decisions for which consumers must bear 
financial responsibility.
185
 Indeed, in a health care system that 
increasingly relies on consumer price sensitivity, individuals and 
families inherently run the risk of racking up significant out-of-
pocket expenses.  
Removing this risk altogether is currently unrealistic. Two-thirds 
of all consumers with employer-based insurance already utilize plans 
with consumer-choice principles, and completely subsidizing the 
direct and indirect costs of health care for lower income families 
would be wildly expensive.
186
 Thus, bankruptcy will be the last stop 
 
 182. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. 
 185. And even though health care is a unique service and consumers cannot as easily 
discriminate between health care providers and products as they could between other 
commodities, see supra notes 82–87, consumers can engage in preventative services and save 
money to head off or prepare for illnesses. These steps mirror other well-known and widely 
practiced consumer behavior (such as regularly servicing a car or saving up for replacement 
parts).  
 186. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. While the wisdom or effectiveness of 
consumer-driven plans is debated, supra notes 82–87, the direction and momentum of the 
nation in terms of health plan enrollment is away from the restrictive controls of managed care 
and toward the relative freedom of higher deductible plans. Such freedom comes with a price 
and the risk of significant out-of-pocket expense, of course, but that risk is one that a majority 
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on the line for individuals and families whose health and budgeting 
decisions have resulted in out-of-pocket and indirect health expenses 
that overwhelm their budgets. In this way, medical bankruptcy is the 
final safety net, albeit an undesirable one, of the privately financed, 
consumer-driven health care system largely preserved by the 
Affordable Care Act. 
Therefore, the goal of the Affordable Care Act or the measure of 
its success should not be the elimination of medical bankruptcy. 
Rather, the affordability of care should be the focus. Policymakers 
should focus on reducing the direct costs of medical care and should 
take steps to ensure that out-of-pocket and indirect medical expenses 
do not cause responsible individuals and families to be bankrupted by 
disease or illness. 
First, greater support should be thrown behind long-term disability 
benefits. Even the most financially responsible family will be rocked 
by the ―double whammy‖ of direct and indirect medical expenses and 
prolonged income disruption.
187
 While the Affordable Care Act 
anticipates the direct costs of care, it does not provide adequate 
support for indirect expenses. Long-term disability benefits can 
ensure that the costs of medical care prescribed by the Affordable 
Care Act do not act as a penalty against a well-prepared family whose 
breadwinner is unable to recover her full salary. Furthermore, 
additional long-term disability benefits will aid those policyholders 
whose insurance plans are grandfathered in under the Affordable 
Care Act and are not subject to its out-of-pocket limitations.
188
 
Second, officials must carefully monitor and likely boost subsidies 
in order to match the financial means of low-income families. As 
presently configured, the Affordable Care Act requires a family 
earning $50,000 per year to apply up to 20% of its income to direct 
medical expenses.
189
 If previous trends hold, this formula will impose 
too great a financial burden on even those families that save and plan 
with precision. Medical bills in excess of just 10% of pretax income 
 
of insured citizens are apparently willing to accept. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying 
text. 
 187. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
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was the greatest contributing financial factor for 35% of families that 
declared medical bankruptcy in 2007.
190
 By accurately means-testing 
premium subsidies and the caps on out-of-pocket expenses, the 
Affordable Care Act will successfully obtain near universal coverage 
while also reaping the benefits of the nation‘s privatized, consumer-
driven health care finance system.  
Undoubtedly, it is a fine line to set subsidy levels in a way that 
encourages consumer responsibility and avoids moral hazard all 
while ensuring that lower-income families have meaningful access to 
care. Yet, if subsidies are permitted to harden in their current state, 
then the costs of care may quickly outstrip the means of even the 
most well prepared families. In that case, bankruptcy courts will once 
again become the financial ICU of low-income individuals. 
Legislators ought to establish annual or more frequent reviews of 
subsidy levels to ensure that they accurately augment the needs of 
low and middle-income families. 
CONCLUSION 
More must be done to protect consumers from out-of-pocket 
expenses if the Affordable Care Act is to greatly reduce the number 
of citizens facing medical bankruptcy. The Affordable Care Act 
protects many uninsured and underinsured citizens from catastrophic 
costs by subsidizing the purchase of health plans and prohibiting 
annual and lifetime benefit caps. But the Affordable Care Act does 
not eliminate completely the consumers‘ responsibility for direct out-
of-pocket expenses nor does it effectively shield consumers from the 
indirect expenses of an illness or injury. It is precisely when these 
costs collide with income interruptions due to illness or injury that 
many families will be pushed beyond the brink and into bankruptcy. 
Out-of-pocket subsidies must be boosted and carefully monitored to 
ensure that the real cost of health care coverage is appropriately 
means-tested for all citizens. Additionally, improvements in long-
term disability benefits will keep families from depleting savings and 
drowning in debt if the family breadwinner is incapacitated. 
 
 190. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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While the Affordable Care Act will reduce the number of 
bankruptcies related to medical debt, it is both unrealistic and unwise 
to expect it to completely eliminate the phenomenon. The Affordable 
Care Act preserves the nation‘s private health insurance industry, 
which is rapidly moving away from the tight administrative controls 
of managed care and toward decentralized consumer-choice plans. 
These plans are reliant on higher deductibles and out-of-pocket 
expenses to drive consumer behavior. Though out-of-pocket expenses 
are capped under the Affordable Care Act, the maximum allowable 
out-of-pocket costs are sufficient to consume a family budget and 
drive Americans to bankruptcy. Preventing this scenario requires 
eliminating out-of-pocket expenses, which would, in effect, 
completely insulate consumers from their own choices and wipe out 
incentive-laden consumer-driven health plans.  
The Affordable Care Act does not take this route. Rather, it 
preserves the private health care system and shields consumers from 
the catastrophic costs of medical care. Yet, those needing frequent 
medical care or those unable or unwilling to plan for out-of-pocket 
and indirect medical expenses will likely struggle, as before the 
Affordable Care Act, to afford the costs of their medical care. For 
these individuals and their families, without improvements to 
disability benefits and out-of-pocket subsidies under the Affordable 
Care Act, bankruptcy courts will sadly remain the backstop of our 
nation‘s postreform health care industry. 
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